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PUBLIC LAND OWNERSHIP
UNPRECEDENTED opportunities for large scale municipal reconstruction and
development will undoubtedly be prominent in any program of post-war eco-
nomic readjustment. Various plans now being proposed to cushion the tran-
sition from a wartime to a peacetime economy provide for substantial federal
expenditures on public works construction as one practicable method of ab-
sorbing expanded industrial capacity and manpower released from defense
activities.' Yet if the socially desirable consequences of these opportunities
1. See NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, ArTER DEFENSE-WIIAT? (1941),
BETTER CITIES (1942), THE HOUSE BUILDING INDUSTRY (1942), AFTER THE WAR-
FULL EMPLOYMENT (1942). Alvin H. Hansen, author of the last-mentioned pamphlet,
estimates that there will be an increase of appr6ximately 25 billion dollars in the national
income for consumption purposes after the war. If post-war depression and unemploy-
ment are to be averted, this income must find suitable outlets; and Mr. Hansen urges
an enlarged program of federal expenditures on social welfare, particularly housing, as
one such outlet. For the efficiency of public works expenditures in absorbing idle men
and materials, see NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, OUR PUBLIC WORKS EXI'E-
RIENCE (1941) ; STRAUSS AND WEGG, HOUSING CO-MES OF AGE (1938) 146. For the various
types of plans proposed see BLACK, PLANNING FOR THE SMALL AMERICAN CITY (1938);
CONFERENCE ON URBANISM, HARVARD UNIVERSITY (Greer ed.), THE PROBLEM OF TIIE
CITIES AND TOWNS (1942); FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, A HANDBOOK OF URBAN
REDEVELOPMENT FOR CITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); GREER AND HANSEN, URBAN
REDEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING (1941); 2 NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE, URBAN
PLANNING AND LAND POLICIES (1939); RFm AND OGG, NEW HOMES FOR OLD (1940);
Greer, City Replanning and Rebuilding (1942) 18 J. OF LAND & P. U. ECON. 284.
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for reconstruction are to be fully realized, there must first be a change in tra-
ditional attitudes toward land utilization. The assemblage of large, contiguous
areas of land under public control, a measure deemed basic to sound city
building by the consensus of professional planning opinion,2 will clearly be
difficult in a country where real estate is characteristically in many small own-
erships and where a lingering laissez-faire philosophy resists any modification
of an individual owner's property rights.3 Satisfactory resolution of this prob-
lem will compel the recognition that land is no longer a commodity intended
only for an individual's use or speculative ventures, but is a public utility
requiring extensive municipal ownership as well as regulation.m4
THE NEED FOR MUNICIPAL LAND OWNERSHIP
Unrestricted private ownership of land has encouraged an anti-social and
uneconomic utilization of property in the typical American city.5 Wildcat
speculation has resulted in either premature and poorly planned subdivisions
or the overdevelopment of land in concentrated areas. Costly traffic conges-
tion 6 has been occasioned by streets lacking differential widths and arranged
in a gridiron pattern to facilitate intensive land uses. Fluid transportation and
crowded urban living conditions have caused a rapid flight of population to
attractive outlying districts 7 and an accompanying deterioration of central
areas, necessitating the expense of maintaining blighted residential sections
as well as providing public utilities for the new developments. Since the un-
realistic value-structure of vacant and misused property prompts tax delin-
2. See, e.g., CONFERENCE ON URBANISM. HARVARD UNI-ERSITY, op. Cit. supra note 1
passim; FEDERAL HOUSING AUTrHORrY. op. cit. supra note 1, at 15 et seq.; 2 NXAIUNAL
REsoTimcs COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 312-28; XATIONA. REsounc-s Pu:uNG
BoARD, BzrTEa CITIES (1942) 19 and HOuSING THE CONTINUING PnoBLEm (1940) 11.
3. See NATIONAL RESOURcEs PLANNING BoA.m, BETTER CITIEs (1942) 11; 'Mc-
Dougal and Maueller, Public Purpose in Public Housing: An Anachroniin Reburied
(1942) 52 YAL.E L. J. 42; Moore, The Emerqcnce of Yezzt , Property Conceplions in America
(1943) 1 J. OF LEGAL & PoL SOCIOLOGY 34.
4. See 2 FORD, SLUMS AND HousING (1936) 841; Heydecker, Public Ownership
and Control of Urban and Suburban Land (1937) 26 NAT. MuNic. REv. 561.
5. For detailed discussions of conditions which are briefly described in the text, see
ABRAMS, REVOLUTION IN LAND (1939) cc. 2,7, 13; ADAMs, THE DESIGN oFREsMNTrL%
AREAS (1934) c. 3; GREER AND HANSEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3-5; .MUmFr, THE
CULTURE OF CITIES (1938) cc. 3-4; NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE, OuR CITIEs (1937)
55-69 and URBAX PLANNING AND LAND PoLIcIEs (1939) 217-24; WLKER, UreaN
BLIGHT AND SLUMS (1938) cc. 1-5, 9-10. For the different attitude toward land which has
been partly retained by some Continental cities with long municipal traditions, see GrL-
HAM. HOUSING IN SCANDINAVIA (1940) 8.
6. It has been estimated that the cost of traffic congestion in Manhattan is $5C0,]
per day. See 3 REGIONAL SURVEY OF NEW YORK AND ITS ENVIRONS (1927) 60.
7. Increasing unit costs of municipal utilities have also operated to counter-balance
the economic advantages of larger cities, and the shift of the power base to mobile elec-
tricity has prepared the way for decentralization. See M1UMFORD, THE CULTCI X uF
CITIEs (1938) 240-45, 342-47.
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quency, s municipal financial needs, largely dependent upon the real property
tax as a source of income, have compelled borrowing at interest or increased
levies on the nondelinquent property which still pays. Esthetic and recrea-
tional values have been sacrificed to the indiscriminate intermingling of busi-
ness, industry, and housing. And social problems of a serious magnitude
have long been provoked by slum and blighted areas.
Extensive public ownership of land appears to be the most effective tech-
nique of countering this unplanned chaos. Lesser degrees of control-such
as zoning, subdivision regulation, or private agreements-lacking any
affirmative compulsion and operating at best only prospectively for undevel-
oped areas, have clearly evidenced their inadequacy in several decades of
experimentation. 9 Thus although a well-drafted zoning law can do much to
prevent encroachment of business upon residential property and enforce a
desirable homogeneity in new building, judicial construction of constitutional
limits has curtailed the effectiveness of such a law in eliminating non-conform-
ing uses and providing for future developments.'0 Moreover, the rigidity of
zoning prevents ready adaptation to population and industrial shifts; yet an ef-
fort to introduce flexibility often results in piecemeal administrative responses
to demands for variance and exceptions." Subdivision control, nominally avail-
able in many municipalities, 12 may effectively regulate physical environment
in preventing overcrowding and disorderly growth; but it is not designed to
control expansion which may prove economically and socially disruptive.' 0
Building codes afford either too much or too little protection and, in addi-
tion,' 4 overlook the fact that an attractive and homogeneous neighborhood
is just as important as a soundly built structure. While differential taxation
8. It has been estimated that at the end of 1935, the average tax delinquency of 97
representative American cities was 48.4 per cent of that year's levy. See 2 NATIONAL
RESOURCES CommiTTEE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 250.
9. See CONFERENCE ON URBANISm, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, Op. Cit. supra note 1, at
48-50; 2 NATIONAL RESOURCES CoImMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 329-49.
10. See, for example, the distressing opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in
Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N. Y. 222, 15 N, E. (2d) 587 (1938).
See generally Light, Aesthetics in Zoning (1930) 14 MINN. L. REV. 109; Noel, Retro-
active Zoning and Nuisances (1941) 41 COL. L. REV. 457; cf.' Bartholomew, Non-
Conforming Uses Destroy the Neighborhood (1939) 15 J. oF LAND & P. U. EcoN. 96.
11. See NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, PUBLIC LAND ACQUISITION (1941)
pt. 2, p. 6.
12. See, e.g., Wash. Laws 1937, c. 186; NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 7; Monchow, Subdivision Legislation in 1937 (1938) 14 J. OF
LAND & P. U. EcoN. 83, 84. For the disproportion between supply and demand in the
development of subdivisions near Chicago, see Monchow, Population and Subdividing
Activity in the Region of Chicago: 1871-1930 (1933) 9 J. OF LAND & P. U. ECON. 192.
13. See CORNICK, PREMATURE SUBDIVISION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1938); 2 NA-
TIONAL REsouRCEs CoImITrEE, op. cit. .rpra note 1, at 217-21.
14. See NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, loc. cit. supra note 12; MATHISON,




roughly encourages the most desirable use of property ly taxing real estate
according to function rather than value,"5 its indirect effect upon sound land-
use patterns and the necessary revision of established tax bases present serious
difficulties. Nuisance abatement actions merely provide retrospective, small-
area planning by an unskilled judicial institution lacking adequate powers of
enforcement or supervision. 16 And finally, such private controls as covenants
and equitable restrictions are not only generally limited in application to raw
land under single ownership because of traditional legal concepts, but may
even bring about results which are contrary to the dictates of sound planning,
since there is neither adequate pre-planning on a large scale nor assur-
ance of permanency.'
7
In view of these deficiencies in present regulatory measures, it is the con-
clusion of planning experts that the complete control of property provided by
fee-simple public ownership offers the most satisfactory method of directing
urban land policies.' 8 Extensive municipal land ownership is promising 1
not only for replanning developed urban areas, but also as a reserve for future
needs and as a means of controlling private property uses. Thus blighted sec-
tions and premature subdivisions could be acquired by the municipality for
replatting and title-clearing and either retained for development at public
expense or resold with restrictive covenants to control future use. Assembly
of large reserves of undeveloped land, both simpler and cheaper than rehabili-
15. See generally 2 NATIONAL RESOURCES COMIlTn-, op. Cit. supra note 1, at 2S2-311;
WALKER, URBAN BLIGHT AND SLUMS (1938) cc. 18-22; ef. An rzas, L,-.w x-- Ri:0LUm-
noN (1939) c. 9.
16. See CONFERENCE ON URBANISd, HARVARD UNIvz sr, Op. cit. supra note 1, at
47; Lloyd, Noisc as a Nuisance (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 567; Noel, Unaestlhetic
Sights as Nuisances (1939) 25 CoRN. L. Q. 1.
17. See CLARK, REAL COVENANTS (1929) Passim; CONFERENCE ON Ura,%. :Is, HAn-
vARD UNivEESrry, op. cit. supra note 1, at 48; Note (1938) 47 YALE: I. J. 821.
18. See note 2 supra. It is not advocated that public ownership extend to land which
is satisfactorily developed and utilized by private owners, for such acquisition would
create far more serious social and financial problems than now exist. Public acquisition
should rather be primarily concerned with land which is either undeveloped or so p arly
developed as to be a social and economic burden on the community. Premature subdivi-
sions, slum areas, and large tracts of "waste" land on the borders of municipalities fall
within this category. Acquisition of such property would be inexpensive and its redevel-
opment would occasion a relatively slight interference with established private interests;
yet it is just this type of land which must be publicly owned if future municipal growth
is to be intelligent and far-sighted.
19. For excellent discussions of the advantages to be gained from widespread muni-
cipal land ownership, see, in addition to the authorities cited in note 2 supra, Buttenheim
and Cornick, Land Reserves For American Cities (1933) 14 J. or LAND & P. U. EcoN.
254; Hinckley, Municipal Land Policies and Their Application to City Planning and
Housing (1928) 17 NAT. MuNi_. REv. 226; Heydecker, supra note 4. For the objectives
of large-scale, long-term planning, see generally ADA.s, Tn DEsi: or RES -::m%
ARFAs (1934) cc. 8-10, 12-13; BLAck, PLANNING FOR THE SmLL A.1,IA CITY (1933)
pt. 2; 2 XATIONAL RESOuRcES Com .rrrm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 12145.
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tation, would permit full control of future growth and withdraw property from
disruptive exploitation. With such reserves, greenbelts could be established
to restrict the size and disorderly expansion of new developments, to prevent
inharmonious encroachments upon homogeneous communities, or to provide
breathing spaces and recreational areas for congested sections. Further, such
land reserves would serve as a source of future low-cost housing sites, thus
eliminating much of the present obstruction caused by prohibitive land prices. 20
And speculation in land could be substantially governed by disposal of cheap
municipal real estate at strategic intervals. No control short of public owner-
ship will be strong enough to achieve such a thoroughgoing regulation of
urban land-use patterns and policies.
21
Although several methods are available to municipalities in securing land
reserves, only purchase and condemnation appear to be practicable for assem-
bling the large, contiguous tracts required.2 2 Acquisition by gift and adverse
possession are naturally so limited in scope as to be of only subsidiary value,
Foreclosure of the quantities of tax-abandoned land surrounding most muni-
cipalities. might bring fairly large tracts into public ownership at compara-
tively slight expense and with little personal hardship; but this acquisition
technique, apart from the difficulties presented by legislative and judicial
leniency in favor of delinquent interests, would often yield only scattered
parcels of property. The ability to exchange public land outside an acquisition
area for privately-owned land within such a section would render pieces of
land, wherever situated, potentially valuable for municipal purposes. Yet
while this system would enable a municipality to acquire scattered tracts
whenever the market is favorable, secure in the knowledge that the property
might be useful for later exchange, it is purely a supplementary method of
assembly. Thus since gifts, tax reversion, and exchange alone cannot be
20. See the discussion of the importance of land cost for housing in ADAMs, TIul
DESIGN OF RESIDENTIAL AREAS (1934) c. 11; cf. NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 31-32.
21. This conclusion is substantiated by the success of many European cities, particu-
larly on the Continent, in employing large land reserves for just such purposes. See
DENBY, EUROPE REHOUSED (1938).68, 123, 151-52, 231-32; FISHER AND RATCLIFF, EURO-
PEAN HOUSING POLICY AND PRACTICE (1936) pt. VI; GRAHAM, HOUSING IN SCANDINAVIA
(1940) c. 1; 2 NATIONAL RESOURCES CoMIrTTEE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 312-17;
Buttenheim and Cornick, loc. cit. supra note 19. For example, municipal reserves fur-
nished about four-fifths of the land used, between 1919 and 1927, in the great rehousing
achievements of the German Republic; and the larger Swedish cities own at least one-
half of their areas.
22. On the techniques and problems of land acquisition generally, see 2 NATIONAL
RESOURCES COIITTEE, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 229-57; NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING
BOARD, op. cit. supra note 11, at 18-29; WALKER, op. cit. supra note 5, C. 15; MoRaus,
Practical Experiences in Land Acquisition in PROCEEDING OF JOINT NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE ON HOUSING (1935) 69; MORSELL, Practical Side of Land Acquisition in HOUSING
OFFICIALS YEAR BOOK (1936) 127; Woodbury, Land Assembly for Housing Develop-
ients (1934) 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 214.
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depended upon to achieve a continuous pattern of public ownership, purchase
of land on the open market, implemented with the threat of eminent domain
to govern prices and persuade the dissenters, must be looked to as the pri-
mary means of accumulating the substantial land reserves desired.
MNUNICIPAL CAPACITY TO ACQUIRE LAND
Various legal obstacles confront an extensive land acquisition prugram of
purchase and condemnation, however. With the purchase of property being
largely financed through taxation, state legislative enactments authorizing such
municipal expenditures will be subject to the established limitation that the
tax power can be exercised only for a public purpose.2 Similarly, statutes
providing for condemnation will encounter the requirement that the power of
eminent domain cannot be exercised except for a public use.24 In the absence
of legislative authorization, locally instituted land acquisition will conflict
with the generally recognized doctrine that a municipality can exercise only
those powers expressly or impliedly granted it by charter; 2z; and although
23. See COOLEY, TAxAriox (4th ed. 1924) § 87; GnAY, LiMiTA.ons oF TAXI!NG
Powim (1906) §§ 169-406; 5 McQTiLL.AN, utxicr PA. CoironAvroxs (2d ed. 1928)
§§ 2323, 2324. The doctrine apparently originated in Sharpless v. The Mayor of Philadel-
phia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853). See also a classic statement of the concept by Judge Cooley in
People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (1870). For an excellent historical survey of the public
purpose limitation on the taxing and spending power, see 'McAllister, Public Purpos fin
Taxation (1930) 18 CALIF. L. RExr. 137, 241. This doctrine has been extended to restrict
municipal action in acquiring land. See Cleveland v. Ruple, 130 Ohio St. 465, 200 X. E.
507 (1936) ; Bates v. Bassett, 60 Vt. 530, 15 Atl. 200 (188). The requirement has been
written into some state constitutions. See McAllister, supra, at 138. Not only must the
tax be levied for a public benefit, but the purpose of the tax must be germane to the
purposes for which the corporation was organized. Robbins v. Kadyk, 312 Ill. 290, 143
N. E. 863 (1924) ; Floyd v. Perrin, 30 S. C. 1, 8 S. E. 14 (1828). See (1932) 10 TE.X.
L. Rxv. 516.
24. See CooLEY, oNSTiTUTioNAL LimrrATioNs (6th ed. 1890) 651; 1 LE~vxs, EnnNE.XT
DOMAIN (3rd ed. 1909) §§ 16-61, 250-58; 4 McQun.LaN, op. cit. stipra note 23, §§ 1575,
1600. For a thorough discussion of the history and development of the public use concept
in eminent domain, see Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Emneint
Domain (1940) 20 B. U. L. Rm 615. It should be noted that the terms "public purpose"
and "public use" are often used synonymously, but for the sake of clarity the historical
distinction between the two, associating the former with the taxing and spending power
and the latter with eminent domain, will be maintained in this paper. A mure functional
need for recognizing the distinction is suggested by McDougal and Mueller, supra nmte 3,
at 43, n. 6.
25. In most opinions no sharp distinction is drawn between the city's charter power
to acquire property and the correlative power to spend municipal funds fur land purchases.
Since public purpose is used as the test in either case, the two are often treated as
synonymous. See Drexler v. Comm'rs of Town of Bethany Beach, 15 Del. Ch. 214,
135 Atl. 484 (1926); Von Schmidt v. Widber, 105 Cal. 151 (1894). For rare cases
discussing both issues, see Kennedy v. City of Nevada, 222 .Mo. App. 459, 281 S. W. 56
(1926); Le Couteulx v. Buffalo, 33 N. Y. 333 (1865). Judicial discussion usually
proceeds solely on the tax level, however. See Hoslkns v. City of Orlando, 51 F.
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municipal charters usually sanction obtaining real estate for corporate pur-
poses, courts have traditionally refused to extend the scope of such purposes
beyond obviously essential governmental functions.20 Before municipal land
acquisition can be successful it must be tested by these several limitations.2
Since the concepts of public purpose and public use are being increasingly
expanded by the judiciary, it is unlikely that courts would nullify a well-
drafted statute authorizing municipal land acquisition. Such rule-of-thumb
public purpose tests 28 as the sanction of custom and usage, the existence of an
emergency, the inability of private individuals to perform the function, or the
absence of profit to the government have been discarded.20 Narrow views of
public use, such as physical occupation of the premises by public employees in
their official capacity 30 or general use by the public, have also been aban-
doned. 31 The recent judicial trend has been to approve any purpose or use
which is for the general good of all inhabitants, satisfying their needs and
(2d) 901 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) ; City of Eufaula v. McNab, 67 Ala. 588 (1880) ; Peterson
v. Town of Davenport, 90 Fla. 71, 105 So. 265 (1925). The importance of the tax
problem cannot be exaggerated. In Libby v. Portland, 105 Me. 370, 74 Atl. 805 (1909),
the court held that a city could not levy taxes to purchase a farm, but that the same
farm could be acquired as a gift or devise. See further Town of New Shoreham v. Ball,
14 R. I. 566 (1884) (title may be acquired by adverse possession and for other than muni-
cipal purposes).
26. See 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs (5th ed. 1911) § 238; 1 MCQUILLAN,
op. cit. supra note 23, § 367 et seq.; 3 id., § 1204 et seq.; Tooke, The Status of the
Municipal Corporation in American Law (1932) 16 MINN. L. REv. 343. Also see dis-
cussion at p. 645 infra.
27. Municipal property acquired by gift or adverse possession is not subject to any
of these restrictions. When property is obtained in this fashion, the municipality may
use it, disconnected from any public purpose, for its own emolument or advantage. See
Libby v. City of Portland, 105 Me. 370, 74 Atl. 805 (1909) ; Town of New Shoreham v.
Ball, 14 R. I. 566 (1884).
28. For strict applications of these various public purpose "tests", see, e.g., Union
Ice & Coal Co. v. Town of Ruston, 135 La. 898, 66 So. 262 (1914) ; In re Municipal Fuel
Yards, 182 Mass. 605, 66 N. E. 25 (1903) ; Toebe v. City of Munising, 282 Mich. 1, 275
N. W. 744 (1937); Baker v. City of Grand Rapids, 142 Mich. 687, 106 N. W. 208
(1906) ; Stanley v. Jeffries, 86 Mont. 114, 284 Pac. 134 (1929). Also see discussion in
3 DILLON, op. cit. supra note 26, § 1292.
29. See Jones v. Portland, 113 Me. 123, 93 Atl. 41 (1915), aff'd, 245 U. S. 217
(1917); Standard Oil Co. v. Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 207 N. W. 172 (1926), aff'd per
curianz, 275 U. S. 504 (1927) ; Green v. Frazier, 44 N. D. 395, 176 N. W. 11
(1920), aff'd, 253 U. S. 233 (1920) ; Holton v. Camilla, 134 Ga. 560, 68 S. E. 472 (1910) ;
Central Lumber Co. v. Waseca, 152 Minn. 201, 188 N. W. 275 (1922) ; State v. City
of Toledo, 48 Ohio St. 112, 26 N. E. 1061 (1891).
30. See Williams v. Lash, 8 Minn. 496, 505 (1863).
31. The requirement of "use of a proposed structure, facility, or service by everybody
and anybody is one of the abandoned universal tests of a public use." New York City
Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N. Y. 333, 342, 1 N. E. (2d) 153, 155 (1936). Cf.
the statement by Mr. Justice Holmes in Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v.
Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U. S. 30,32 (1916). See also Nichols, supra note 24;
(1930) 4 U. oF CINN. L. REv. 94; and discussion infra at 643.
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contributing to their convenience. 32 And a legislative determination that the
public interest is being subserved is accorded great weight by the courts, such
a determination being disregarded only when there is a clear showing of evi-
dence to the contrary.
33
This broadened public purpose concept is illustrated by the entrance of gov-
ernment into fields once regarded as the exclusive preserves of private enter-
prise. For example, state legislation authorizing a municipality to establish
a fuel yard and supply its inhabitants at cost was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in Jones v. City of Portland.34 Exercise of the taxing power
to support this undertaking was deemed justified by the breakdown of free
competition in supplying a commodity necessary to the residents' life and
health. A North Dakota industrial program providing for the maintenance
of public warehouses, grain elevators, flour mills, and factories, among other
things, was sustained in Green v. Frazier,3 the Supreme Court there empha-
sizing the peculiar economic conditions in the state. Municipal filling-stations
supplying oil and gasoline to inhabitants at cost have been approved even
though a freely competitive business existed and there was no emergency.30
Natural gas plants,3 T tourist camps, 8 golf courses,32 fairgrounds,40 markets,"1
32. See Green v. Frazier, 44 N. D. 395, 176 N. AV. 11 (1920), aff'd, 253 U. S. 233
(1920); City of Tombstone v. Macia, 30 Ariz. 218, 245 Pac. 677 (1926). ". . cities are
not limited to providing for the strict necessities of their citizens. Under legislative
authority they may minister to their comfort, health, pleasure or education. . . . The
purpose must be primarily to satisfy the need or contribute to the convenience of the
people of the city at large." Sun Publishing Ass'n v. Mayor, 8 App. Div. 230, 336,
40 N. Y. Supp. 607, 610 (1st Dep't 1S96), aff'd, 152 N. Y. 257, 46 N. E. 499 (1897).
33. See Denver v. Hallett, 34 Colo. 393, 83 Pac. 1066 (1905); Hagler v. Small,
307 Ill. 460, 138 N. E. 849 (1923); Laughlin v. City of Portland, 111 M.e. 486, 90 At.
318 (1914).
34. 113 Me. 123, 93 At. 41 (1915), aff'd. 245 U. S. 217 (1917). See Note (1918)
27 Y~Ai L. J. 824; (1915) 15 CoL. L. REv. 179; (1918) 3 Corn. L Q. 287; (1918)
16 MicHi. L. REv. 263; (1919) 3 ST. Louis L. Rzv. 219. Also see Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937) ; Central Lumber Co. v. Vaseca, 152 .Minn. 201,
188 N. NV. 275 (1922). But cf. In re Municipal Fuel Yards, 182 Mass. C05, 66 X. E.
25 (1903); Toebe v. City of Munising, 282 Mich. 1, 275 N. W. 744 (1937); Baker
v. City of Grand Rapids, 142 Mich. 687, 106 N. W. 208 (1906) ; Consumers' Coal Co.
v. Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51, 189 N. NV. 643 (1922).
35. 44 N. D. 395, 176 N. NV. 11 (1920), aff'd, 253 U. S. 233 (1920). See Note
(1920) 29 YALE L. J. 933; Comment (1920) 8 CALIF. L. REv. 425.
36. Standard Oil Co. v. Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 207 N. W. 172 (1926), aff'd per
curiam, 275 U. S. 504 (1927); Mutual Oil Co. v. Zehrung, 11 F. (2d) 887 (D. Neb.
1925).
37. State v. City of Toledo, 48 Ohio St. 112, 26 N. E. 1061 (1891).
38. State ex rel. Minner v. Dodge City, 123 Kan. 316, 255 Pac. 387 (1927).
39. Booth v. Minneapolis, 163 Minn. 223, 203 N. INT. 625 (1925).
40. Briggs v. Raleigh, 195 N. C. 223, 141 S. E. 597 (1928).
41. Bank v. Bell, 62 Cal. App. 320, 217 Pac. 538 (1923), 11 CALIF. L REv. 446;
Spaulding v. Lowell, 40 'Mass. 71 (1839).
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airports,42 exhibitions, 43 and advertising44 have also been held valid public
purposes for taxation.
45
Liberalization of public purpose is further evidenced in the use of govern-
ment funds for the support of private industry. Until recently, financial aid
to private interests in the guise of gifts, loans, leases or stock subscriptions
was generally held invalid. 46 Although conceding that the establishment of
factories in a municipality might incidentally advance the public welfare, courts
stressed the more immediate benefit to private individuals in prohibiting such
expenditures. 47 But this doctrine has been discarded in recent cases involving
the encouragement of industrial development in the South.48 In Albrilton v.
42. See, e.g., Burnham v. Mayor and Aldermen of Beverly, 309 Mass. 388, 35 N. E.
(2d) 242 (1941) ; Hesse v. Rath, 224 App. Div. 344, 230 N. Y. Supp. 676 (4th Dep't
1922), aff'd, 249 N. Y. 435, 164 N. E. 342 (1928); State cx rel. Chandler v. Jackson,
121 Ohio St. 186, 167 N. E. 396 (1929) ; Wentz v. Philadelphia, 301 Pa. 261, 151 Atl.
883 (1930). See also (1939) 10 AIR L. REv. 223; (1928) 26 Mxcn. L. Ray. 940; (1930)
17 VA. L. REv. 165. 4
43. Lewis v. LaGuardia, 172 Misc. 82, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 463 (Sup. Ct. 1939),
aff'd, 282 N. Y. 757, 27 N. E. (2d) 44 (1940) (radio broadcast) ; Shelby County v. Tenn.
Centennial Exposition Co., 96 Tenn. 653, 36 S. W. 694 (1896); Moreland v. City of
San Antonio, 116 S. W. (2d) 823 (Tex. Cix. App. 1938). See (1932) 10 Tax L.
Ray. 516.
44. Sacramento Chamber of Commerce v. Stephens, 212 Cal. 607, 299 Pac. 728
(1931) ; City of Jacksonville v. Oldham, 112 Fla. 502, 150 So. 619 (1933) ; Davis
v. City of Taylor, 123 Tex. 39, 67 S. W. (2d) 1033 (1934). Contra: Stuttgart Rice
Mill v. Crandall, 203 Ark. 281, 157 S. W. (2d) 205 (1941). See (1938) 16 TtxAs
L. REv. 276.
45. For more complete discussion of the judicial definition of a public purpose, see
Brown, The Municipality: Its Power to Engage itn Private Business (1927) 2 N. D.
LAWYER 145; Kneier, Municipal Functions and the Law of Public Purpose (1928) 76 U.
OF PA. L. REV. 824; Maxey, Is Government Merchandising Constitutionalf (1918) 52 AM.
L. REV. 215.
46. See Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (U. S. 1874); Allen v. Jay, 60 Me.
124 (1872) ; Opinion of Justices, 58 Me. 590 (1871); Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass, 454
(1873) ; Carothers v. Booneville, 169 Miss. 511, 153 So. 670 (1934) ; Markley v. Village
of Mineral City, 58 Ohio St. 430, 51 N. E. 28 (1898); 5 MCQUILLAN, op. cit. supra
note 23, § 2329. Subsidization of railroads has traditionally proved an exception to this
doctrine, however. See, inter alia, Bridgeport v. R. R., 15 Conn. 475 (1843); Chicago,
Danville & Vincennes R. R. v. Smith, 62 Ill. 268 (1871) ; Nichol v. Nashville, 9 Hump.
252 (Tenn. 1848) ; Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh. 120 (Va. 1837). But cf. Hanson v. Ver-
non, 27 Iowa 28 (1869).
47. Mr. Justice Miller's statement in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (U. S.
1874) is typical. "If it be said that a benefit results to the local public of a town by
establishing manufactures, the same may be said of any other business or pursuit which
employs capital or labor. . . . No line can be drawn in favor of the manufacturer
which would not open the coffers of the public treasury to the importunities of two-
thirds of the business men of the city or town." Id. at 665. See also Opinion of Justices,
58 Me. 590, 604 (1871) ; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454, 472 (1873).
48. For a consideration of the economic implications of this policy, see Note (1938)
47 YALE L. J. 1412; (1938) 12 TULANE L. REV. 645.
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City of Whiona,49 the Mississippi Supreme Court sustained a statute empower-
ing cities to build, acquire, operate, sell or lease any industrial enterprise under
the supervision of a State Industrial Commission; and construction of a
textile mill for private manufacturers under authority of this statute was jus-
tified as beneficial to the general economic interests of the city. Similarly,
payment of commissions to individuals procuring the location of factories in
a Florida city has been deemed a valid exercise of the tax power. 0
The public use limitation upon eminent domain has undergone an analogous
modification. 51 It is now established that a private corporation or individual
may be granted the power of eminent domain as long as the general objective
of the use of his power contributes to the public welfare and advantage.r- A
logging railroad to serve a single lumber company,3 an irrigation system pri-
marily for one landowner's benefit,G4 and an aerial bucket line for a private
mine 5 have been held sufficient public uses to warrant the exercise of emi-
nent domain for their construction. Approval of condemnation of property
for slum clearance and rehousing typifies the liberal view, the legitimacy of
the purpose as a whole rather than the intended use of the particular property
49. 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799 (1938), appeal dismissed, 303 U. S. 627 (1938) (no
substantial federal question), 47 YALE L. J. 1412, 27 Go. L. J. 97. The Mississippi
court said: ". . a wise statesmanship must look beyond the expenditures which are
absolutely needful to the continued existence of organized government, and embrace
others which may tend to make that government subserve the general well-being of
society and advance the present and prospective happiness and prosperity of the people."
181 Miss. at 99, 178 So. at 804.
50. City of Fernandina v. State, 143 Fla. 802, 197 So. 454 (1940). The court
remarked that "attention to the economic welfare is one of the main concerns of the
modern city." 143 Fla. at 807, 197 So. at 456. Cf. Carroll v. Cedar Falls, 221 Iovwa
277, 261 N. NV. 652 (1935) ; Comments (1941) 9 DuKE B. A. J. 15, (1928) 41 Hinv.
L. REv. 775.
51. It has been pointed out that courts are more inclined to expand public use than
public purpose when governmental aid to private interests is concerned, since there are
greater opportunities for abuse in the expenditure of public funds for private enterprises
than in granting such interests the power of eminent domain. But the reason for this
distinction disappears when dealing with public undertakings, for then all property is
to be held in the public interest. *McDougal and Mueller, loc. cit. supra note 24. Thus
in considering the validity of public land ownership, the public purpose and public use
tests should be used interchangeably.
52. See Nichols, loc. cit. suipra note 24; Note (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1519; (1936)
5 GEO. ',WAsia. L. Rav. 131; Comment (1928) 41 HAv. L. REv. 775.
53. Goose Creek Lumber Co. v. White, 219 Ky. 739, 294 S. NV. 494 (1927).
54. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 (1896). "The fact that the
use of the water is limited to the landowner is not therefore a fatal objection to this
legislation. It is not essential that the entire community or even any considerable portion
thereof should directly enjoy or participate in an improvement in order to constitute
a public use." Id. at 161. See also O'Neill v. Leamer, 239 U. S. 244 (1915); Clark v.
Nash, 198 U. S. 361 (1905).
55. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527 (1906).
19431
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
being the criterion almost universally adopted by the courts. 0 Thus munici-
pal exercise of both tax and eminent domain powers has been upheld in many
states as promoting the public health, safety, morals, and economic welfare
even though the direct benefit inures only to a limited class of people.07
In the light of these liberal definitions of public use and public purpose,
courts should experience no difficulty in sustaining legislation authorizing
extensive municipal acquisition of real estate. A cheap and adequate supply
of land is now recognized to be as indispensable to satisfactory urban living
conditions as heat, light, gas, or water. There can be little doubt that proper
housing, recreational facilities, and utilization of land will contribute to the
general health, safety, convenience, and welfare of a municipality's inhabitants,
Moreover, an established reason for permitting municipal participation in
activities usually reserved to private enterprise has been the breakdown of
the free market, and this breakdown has been most serious in allocating a ne-
cessarily limited commodity like land to human use.58 Finally, the elimination
of blighted areas, proper subdivision control, and regulation of land values
made possible by municipal land ownership would clearly constitute as general
an economic benefit as encouragement of private industry or construction of a
logging railroad for a single lumber company.
Although the validity of extensive municipal land acquisition sanctioned
by statute has never been judicially tested, the nearest case in point, First
Municipality of New Orleans v. McDonough," suggests a precedent for per-
mitting such activity. In that case the municipality, acting tinder broader-
than-usual legislative authority to acquire, enjoy, and dispose of property,
purchased a large, run-down area deemed to be a public nuisance. After razing
obsolete buildings, the land was replatted and resold to private owners with
56. See McDougal and Mueller, loc. cit. supra note 3 and authorities cited therein,
particularly at n. 13. See also Ebenstein, The Law of Public Housing (1939) 23 MINX.
L. REv. 879.
57. The statement in Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky. 97, 109, 103 S. W. (2d) 651, 657
(1937) is typical-*
"The act limits the ultimate use of the improved property to such persons
as may be selected to occupy. This does not brand the purpose as class or
special legislation. Whether or not the persons chosen to occupy are to be
ultimately benefited more than those who are not, is a sociological question
because of differing circumstances. . . . The fact that all individuals may
not be elected to occupy the reconditioned premises is not material."
58. Should realty companies seek to enjoin municipal land programs because of a
threatened destruction of their business in violation of due process, strong analogies
could be invoked to uphold the city's right to compete. Even where public utility com-
panies have a charter from the state, a presumption has traditionally been created by
the courts against the grant of a monopolistic franchise. Tennessee Electric Power Co.
v. T. V. A., 306 U. S. 118 (1939); Madera Water Works v. Madera, 228 U. S. 454
(1913); Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22 (1906).
59. 2 Rob. 244 (La. 1842). This decision is severely criticized in 3 DILLON, op. cit.
supra note 26, § 978.
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restrictive covenants to control future use. The acquisition of this property
together with taxation to defray expenses was upheld under the city's power
to improve the health and open the streets for public convenience. Nor was
the possible accrual of revenue to the municipality considered fatal, the court
describing such speculative profits as merely incidental to the undertaking.
More recent authority for governmental land acquisition is provided by State
of Washington v. Cla uscn,0 0 the court there sustaining a land settlement act
empowering the state to purchase, improve, and resell agricultural land to
home-owning farmers.
While public purpose and public use have been expanded to remove most
of the limitations once placed on state legislation, the scope of municipal char-
ter powers to tax or condemn property for corporate purposes has not been
extended.61 In an effort to safeguard against corruption or unsound fiscal poli-
cies of local government officials, 2 courts have restricted the powers normally
conferred on cities to the narrowest limits of the statutory grant,c3 resolving
any reasonable doubt as to their existence against the municipality.ra Since
60. 110 Wash. 525, 188 Pac. 538 (1920).
61. This is the case despite the repeated statement that "the trend of authority
• . . has been in the direction of permitting municipalities a wider range in under-
taking to promote public welfare and enjoyment." Egan v. San Francisco, 165 Cal.
576, 581, 133 Pac. 294, 295 (1913).
Although an exception to the general rule, the desirable method of treatment is
illustrated by State v. Barnes, 22 Okla. 191, 97 Pac. 997 (1908). The city sought to
issue bonds to erect a public convention hall under a constitutional provision empowering
municipalities to become indebted to construct public utilities. Construing public utility
to mean public use, the court upheld the issuance of bonds on the theory that the
determination of the local legislative body on the question of public use should not b2
overturned unless clearly without reasonable foundation. See also, City of Fernandina
v. State, 143 Fla. 802, 197 So. 454 (1940).
62. "Municipal authorities are not ahays as careful about the rights of those
whom they represent as they should be, and it devolves upon the courts to carefully
guard the welfare and well-being of the community." Bloomsburg Imp. Co. v. Bloms-
burg, 215 Pa. 452, 459, 64 Atl. 602, 605 (1906). See Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio 523
(1849). Thus, the doctrine of ultra vires has been rigidly enforced to protect taxpayers
"from being plundered." Fergus Falls v. Fergus Falls Hotel Co., 80 Minn. 165, 170,
83 N. W. 54, 55 (1900). See Farwell v. Seattle, 43 Wash. 141, 86 Pac. 217 (1905).
63.- See Wallace v. San Jose, 29 Cal. 180 (1865) ; Leonard v. Canton, 35 'Miss. 189
(1858); Redell v. Moores, 63 Neb. 219, 88 N. AV. 243 (1901) (since municipality is
special jurisdiction created for specified purposes, it must be confined to exercise of
powers specifically enumerated).
"In ascertaining the extent of corporate powers, there is no rule of safety, but the
rule of strict construction." Merrill v. Monticello, 138 U. S. 673, 692 (1891). See also
Detroit v. Detroit City Ry., 56 Fed. 867 (C. C. E. D. Mich. 1893) ; Stone v. Chicago,
207 Ill. 492, 69 N. E. 970 (1904). The rule is intended to protect dissenting minority
interests against the extention of municipal activities to unlimited and indefinite fields.
See 1 DILLON, op. cit. supra note 26, § 238; Tooke, loc. cit. supra note 26.
64. See Merrill v. Monticello, 138 U. S. 673 (1891) ; Fort Scott v. Eads Bro!:erage
Co., 117 Fed. 51 (C. C. A. Sth, 1902); Brooks v. Towm of Brooklyn, 146 Iowa 135,
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the possibilities of political abuse are ever present in land transactions,0 6 the
power to buy property for special purposes is not usually bestowed upon a
municipal corporation, nor is it thought to arise by implication from the typi-
cally granted charter power to acquire property for corporate purposes.'"
Rather has a municipality's power to secure land for corporate purposes been
construed not to extend beyond such obvious public uses as city halls,67 free
public libraries,68 and parks. 9 In some instances, however, the acquisition of
land necessary for the proper exercise of a municipal function has been sanc-
tioned without statutory authorization; as where the power to maintain a
public building, market, or water system has carried by implication the per-
mission to obtain property for such purposes.1 0
124 N. W. 868 (1910) (reasonable doubt is fatal to existence of power). See (1940)
19 NEB. L. BULL 210, 211. The presumption is that the state has granted in clear and
unmistakable terms all it has intended to grant. Ravenna v. Pennsylvania Co., 45 Ohio
St. 118, 12 N. E. 445 (1887). See 1 McQUILLAN, 10c. cit. supra note 23, § 368.
65. "This doctrine is vital to the public welfare." Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park,
97 U. S. 659, 666 (1878); Dailey v. New Haven, 60 Conn. 314, 319, 22 Atl. 945, 947
(1891) ("safeguard against the tendency of municipalities to embark in enterprises not
germane to the objects for which they are incorporated.")
66. See 3 MCQUILLAN, Op. cit. supra note 23, § 1207 and cases cited therein. See
also, Schulman, Legal Aspects of Municipal Land Ownership (1940) 16 J. OF LAND
& P. U. EcoN. 216. "A view more liberal . . . might involve these corporations in
much embarrassment, inviting them to prodigal taxation and a lavish expenditure of
its proceeds in works more fanciful than really promotive of the best interests of the
municipality." Livingston County v. Weider, 64 IIl. 427, 432 (1872).
It has been stated that such implied powers will be construed more strictly than
in the case of private corporations. There must be a necessity for the exercise of the
power, and not mere convenience. Crofut v. City of Danbury, 65 Conn. 294, 32 Ati.
365 (1894).
67. Wilkerson v. Lexington, 188 Ky. 381, 222 S. W. 74 (1920) (power to buy land
for use of city includes site for municipal hall and auditorium) ; Parker v. Concord,
71 N. H. 468, 52 Ati. 1095 (1902).
68. Tampa v. Prince, 63 Fla. 387, 58 So. 542 (1912).
69. Lexington v. Kentucky Chautaugua Assembly, 114 Ky. 781, 71 S. W. 943 (1903);
Vrooman v. St. Louis, 337 Mo. 933, 88 S.W. (2d) 189 (1935). Contra: Vaughn v.
Greencastle, 104 Mo. App. 206, 78 S. W. 50 (1904). See Golf View Realty Co. v.
Sioux City, 222 Iowa 433, 269 N. W. 451 (1936) (park includes golf course).
70. See, e.g., Shiedley v. Lynch, 95 Mo. 487, 8 S. W. 434 (1888) (court house);
Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356 (1856) (market place) ; Smith v. Newburn, 70 N. C.
14 (1874) (same). See Yegen v. Board of Comm'rs of Yellowstone County, 34 Mont.
79, 85 Pac. 740 (1906) (detention hospital) ; Poillon v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 132, 4 N. E.
191 (1886) (public bath). Compare Capen v. City of Portland, 112 Ore. 14, 228 Pac.
105 (1924) (golf course is public utility within charter). Contra: City of Brandentown
v. Florida, 88 Fla. 381, 102 So. 556 (1924) (power to purchase land for public park
does not authorize acquisition for golf course). Some cases recognize an inherent
power in municipal corporations to acquire land, limited to that necessary to establish
requisite municipal buildings. See Phipps v. Morrow, 49 Ga. 37 (1873); Worcester
v. Eaton, 13 Mass. 371 (1816).
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Although there is little direct judicial authority on the precise question of
establishing extensive land reserves without legislative sanction, it is generally
stated that the widespread purchase and sale of property by a municipality
is not within the category of a valid corporate purpose.7 1 This doctrine, how-
ever, is based primarily on dicta arising from a variety of narrow and distin-
guishable fact situations.7 2 Thus in Hayward z. Red Cliff 73 the court, in nul-
lifying an agreement to pay individuals commissions for selling property ac-
quired under a federal town-site patent, stated that it is "idle to claim that a
municipal corporation can lawfully engage in the business of buying, selling,
or dealing generally in real estate, either as principal or broker." -,4 But the
facts that the federal statute granting the patents did not contemplate these
commission payments and that such payments would subject the property
to an unreasonable financial burden were apparently the actual bases of the
decision. Municipal purchase of a building and lot, the vendor retaining
power to pay rentals- to the city for the use of the premises, was denied judi-
cial sanction in Hunnicutt v. City of Atlanta.75 NWhile the court again declared
that a city cannot "embark in speculative ventures or make any contracts in the
nature of mere investments," 70 the fundamental objection to the purchase was
the seller's right to defeat the municipality's absolute ownership of the prop-
erty by refusing to accept full payment.7 7 Similarly, since the bids at tax de-
linquency or mortgage foreclosure sales may never mature into full title,
municipal efforts to secure unpaid claims by purchasing property at such
71. See, e.g., 3 DILLON, op. cit. supra note 26, § 978.
72. Moreover, judicial hostility to municipal land purchases, finding expression more
in an underlying than an express presumption against their validity, should be replaced
by the contrary presumption. See Drexler v. Comm'rs of Town of Bethany Beach,
15 Del. CI. 214, 135 At. 484 (1926); City of Sanford v. Dofnos Corp., 115 Fla. 795,
156 So. 142 (1934) ; Board of Comm'rs of Henry County v. Slatter, 52 Ind. 171 (1875)
(purchase presumed authorized by law unless contrary showing made). Contra:
Von Schmidt v. Widber, 105 Cal. 151, 38 Pac. 682 (1894).
73. 20 Colo. 33, 36 Pac. 795 (1894).
74. Id. at 37, 36 Pac. at 796.
75. 104 Ga. 1, 30 S. E. 500 (1898).
76. Id. at 5,30 S. E. at 502.
77. See further Mayor & Alderman of Wetumpha v. Wetumpka Wharf Co., 63 Ala.
611, 624 (1879) (bonds given for money lent to city to subscribe to stock of trans-
portation company held to be authorized by statute, but conditions precedent to issuance
of bonds not fulfilled; dicta to effect that "private gain, trading, speculation or the
derivation of pecuniary profit are not purposes or objects within the contemplatic
of the charter"); Bank of Michigan v. Niles, 1 Doug. 401 (Mich. 1844) (charter
empowered bank to acquire and hold real estate only for its accommodation in con-
venient transaction of its business or such land as might be mortgaged to it by vy
of security, conveyed to it in satisfaction of past debts or purchased at sales on judg-
ments obtained for such debts; power to buy land for resale denied); Trustees of
Davidson College v. Chambers' Execdrs, 56 N. C. 253 (1857) (statute incorporating
trustees of college provided that their property should not exceed fixed sum at any
time; in suit for legacy exceeding that amount, recovery allowed only for sum necessary
to make entire property equal charter limit).
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sales have, in the absence of statutory authorization, been deemed invalid
speculations.7" In Bloomsburg Land Corporation v. Bloomsburg,79 acquir-
ing a park for the specific purpose of deriving income by charging admission
fees was invalidated as an investment in property beyond the scope of a muni-
cipality's authority.80
This judicial antipathy to municipal land acquisition for other than a nar-
rowly limited category of corporate purposes finds its origins in early common
law. English municipal corporations once possessed unfettered power to ac-
quire, hold, and alienate property for any purposes not inconsistent with those
for which they were established.8 ' Accumulation of vast ecclesiastical estates
and the loss of many feudal profits led, however, to the enactment of the Stat-
utes of Mortmain, by which corporate land acquisition was forbidden without
a license from the Crown.82 Although this legislatioft is not assumed to be in
force in this country,83 its restraining effect is achieved by severely curtailing
the scope of corporate purposes for which a municipality may utilize land.
Comparatively recent legislative and judicial expansion of the meaning of
corporate purpose suggests by analogy, however, that widespread municipal
land acquisition might warrant a modification of traditional limitations. For
example, local planning legislation enacted by forty states 84 clearly indicates
a broadening of the corporate purpose concept. This legislation typically
78. City of Champaign v. Harmon, 98 Ill. 491 (1881); City of Sanford v. Dofnos
Corp., 115 Fla 795, 156 So. 142 (1934); Buell v. Arnold, 124 Wis. 65, 102 N. W. 338
(1905) ; See Mills v. Forest Preserve Dist., 345 111. 503, 178 N. E. 126 (1931) ; Young
v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland, 170 Md. 505, 185 At. 450 (1936).
79. 215 Pa. 452, 64 Atl. 602 (1906).
80. The emotional antipathy to any program of public land ownership is epitomized
by this statement from Opinion of Justices, 211 Mass. 624, 629, 98 N. E. 611, 614 (1912)
"Ownership of a bit of land is one of the deep seated desires of mankind.
The property resting on such proprietorship is among the dearest rights in
the minds of many people secured by the Constitution. If the power exists
in the Legislature to take a tract of land away from one owner for the
purpose of enabling another to get the same tract, the whole subject of such
ownership becomes a matter of legislative determination and not of consti-
tutional right."
81. See 1 BL. Co ,xM.* 475, *478; 1 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY (4th ed. 1876) 50;
Nicoll v. N. Y. & E. Ry., 12 N. Y. 121, 127 (1854).
82. See Trustees of Davidson College v. Chambers' Exec'rs, 56 N. C. 253, 266
(1857) ; 3 DILLON, op. cit. supra note 26, § 971.
83. The political motives causing the enactment of the legislation never extended
to the United States. 2 KENT'S Comxi.* 282, *283. See Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo.
543, 575 (1860). Thus, the statutes were not in effect unless expressly adopted. Pern
v. Carey, 24 How. 465 (U. S. 1860); Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 366 (1861).
84. All states except Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, South
Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming have enacted such legislation. See NATIONAL Rsoui.CES
PLANNING BOARD, STATE LEGISLATION ON PLANNING, ZONING AND PLATTING (Rev.
Circular XII, December 15, 1941) for a comprehensive compilation of the various state
statutes.
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authorizes the establishment of local planning commissions to formulate a
comprehensive municipal plan for the location of streets, buildings, recrea-
tional facilities, and public utilities, and to enforce conformity of future public
improvements with such a plan.8s Although these planning commissions
exercise restrictive rather than positive powers, their creation is in reality a
legislative declaration of the need for adequate land control by local govern-
mental bodies. This legislative pronouncement that proper regulation of land
policies now constitutes a corporate purpose would appear to support the va-
lidity of a local acquisition program initiated under a municipality's general
charter power to secure land for corporate purposes.
A judicial tendency to enlarge the scope of those corporate purposes which
arise by implication or necessity from powers specifically conferred in a muni-
cipal charter is evidenced by permitting the acquisition of extraterritorial
property. Although not expressly provided by statute or charter, purchase
of real estate beyond a municipality's boundaries has been sustained upon an
implied authority for such admittedly essential functions as a water supply,
sewage drain, and even a rock quarry.80 With the growth of municipal owner-
ship of public utilities there has also been a marked extraterritorial extension
of such services despite the absence of statutory sanction.8 T The realization
that efficient government requires the acquisition and administration of prop-
erty beyond a municipality's territorial domain has compelled this departure
from a strict construction of the corporate purpose doctrine. s And, by anal-
ogy, it could be argued that as widespread land acquisition is becoming in-
creasingly essential to efficient government, there is no persuasive reason why
its validity should not be implied from the general corporate power to obtain
property for functions germane to the objects of a municipality's incorpora-
tion.
While most cotrts embrace the notion that municipalities have derived their
existence from statutory fiat and cannot exceed the bounds of that authority,s
85. See, e.g., Is- REv. STAT. (Bar Ass'n Ed. 1941) c. 24, art. 53; MAss. Gci='x.
LAWS (1932) c. 41, § 70-72 (mandatory for all cities over 10,000 population); N. Y.
GEN ' CITy LAW, §§ 26-38. See BLAcK, PLANrtrI FOR THE Szxtu. A-ieaxcm Crx,
(1938) 20.
86. See Hall v. Calhoun, 140 Ga. 611, 79 S. E. 533 (1913) (water supply);
Somerville v. Waltham, 170 Mass. 160, 48 N. E. 1092 (1893); Coldwater v. Tucher,
36 Mich. 474 (1877) (sewage drain) ; Hafner v. St. Louis, 161 Mo. 34, 61 S. AV. 632
(1901) ; Capen v. Portland, 112 Ore. 14, 228 Pac. 105 (1924) (golf course); Schneider
v. Menasha, 118 Wis. 298, 95 N. IV. 94 (1903) (rock quarry). For complete collection
of cases, see 3 McQuiLLAq, op. cit. supra note 23, § 1210. See also Hemingway, The
Extraterritorial Powers of a Municipality (1936) 24 Ky. L. J. 107; Comment (1921)
19 'Mica. L. REv. 352.
87. See (1940) 19 NEB. L. REv. 210 and cases cited therein. Cf. (1937) 24 VA.
L. REv. 206.
88. See Anderson, The Extraterritorial Powers of Cities (1926) 10 Mn:.x. L. Rt-v.
475; (1927) 61 Am. L. Rev. 641; (1928) 41 Htnv. L. Rv. 894.
89. The weight of authority has rejected the theory of an inherent right of local
self-government, and municipal corporations are regarded rather as mere instrumentalities
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the power of a city to manage its own affairs has been conferred in fourteen
states by constitutional amendments or statutes permitting local governments
to frame and adopt their own charters. 0 With such home rule charters, mu-
nicipalities have become at least theoretically independent of direct legislative
control and liberated from the confines of the corporate purpose limitation.91
Since home rule charters are generally considered a grant of rights subject
only to certain enumerated restrictions rather than a bestowal of definitely
specified powers,92 such activities as municipal filling-stations,9 3 markets, 4
and advertising 95 have been undertaken by municipalities having these char-
ters without the necessity of the express legislative sanction which otherwise
would have been essential. 96 Likewise, a land acquisition program should
be available to any municipality possessing a home rule charter despite a nar-
row judicial definition of corporate purpose or the lack of statutory authoriza-
tion.
Excess condemnation, although now in judicial disfavor, presents another
possible means of by-passing the restraints imposed upon land acquisition.
While courts have been extremely reluctant to sanction the condemnation of
property which is incidental rather than necessary to the actual creation of a
public improvement,97 such exercise of eminent domain is thoroughly consist-
of the state created for purposes of convenient administration. See Elseneau v. Chicago,
334 Ili. 78, 165 N. E. 129 (1929) ; McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local
Self-Government (1916) 16 COL. L. REv. 190, 299; Tooke, Construction and Operation
of Municipal Powers (1933) 7 TEMP. L. Q. 267. The contrary view is not without
some support. See State v. Barker, 116 Iowa 96, 89 N. W. 204 (1902); Eaton, The
Right to Local Self-Government (1900) 13 HARv. L. REv. 441, 570, 638; (1901) 14 HAIMy.
L. REV. 20, 116.
90. By constitutional provision: California, Colorado, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, and
Utah. By statute: Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Washington, and Wisconsin. See (1938) 6 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 494 for an analysis of
these "home rule" provisions.
91. For criticism of the restriction imposed upon home rule government see (1937)
37 COL. L. REv. 557; (1940) 38 MICH. L. REV. 914; (1939) 18 ORE. L. REV. 216,
92. See City of Pontiac v. Ducharme, 278 Mich. 474, 270 N. W. 754, 756 (1936);
GOODNOW, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1916); McGOLDRIcx, THE LAW AND PRAcrIC OF
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE, 1916-30 (1933).
93. Standard Oil Co. v. Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 207 N. W. 172 (1926), aff'd per
curiam, 275 U. S. 504 (1927).
94. Bank v. Bell, 62 Cal. App. 320, 217 Pac. 538 (1923), 11 CALIF. L. REV. 446,
95. Davis v. City of Taylor, 123 Texas 39, 67 S. W. (2d) 1033 (1934).
96. See Huessing v. City of Rock Island, 128 Ill. 465, 21 N. E. 558, (1889) (public
slaughterhouse invalid in absence of express statutory authorization) ; Toebe v. City
of Munising, 282 Mich. 1, 275 N. W. 744 (1937) (municipal fuel yard invalid since
unauthorized by charter) ; Vaughn v. Greencastle, 104 Mo. App. 206, 78 S. W. 50 (1904)
(purchase of public park invalid because of lack of statutory authorization); Ander-
son v. San Antonio, 123 Texas 163, 67 S. W. (2d) 1036 (1934) (no power to levy
tax for advertising because home rule charter did not expressly provide for it).
97. See Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U. S. 439 (1930); Gregg v. Baltimore, 56 Md.
256 (1881) ; Opinion of Justices, 204 Mass. 607, 91 N. E. 405, (1910); Matter of
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ent with the liberal public use test. s For example, fragments of land abutting
property condemned for a public building or thoroughfare are often so irregu-
lar in size as to be permanently unsaleable or unfit for any use. But with
excess condemnation the municipality may acquire such remnant lots and
redistribute them so that they may be advantageously absorbed by adjacent
landowners. 99 Excess condemnation is also efficacious in preserving the beauty
and usefulness of public improvements, for parks or building projects may be
unable to withstand the disintegrating pressure of surrounding blighted or
slum areas without the protection afforded by restrictions upon the use of.
adjacent property.'1 0 In view of these patent public benefits, there are no doc-
trinal barriers prohibiting excess condemnation even in the absence of con-
stitutional amendments or statutes. And if eminent domain is employed to
secure land incidentally beneficial to the public, the use of municipal pur-
chasing power for similar purposes should elicit little objection.
A municipality's recovery of expenses or realization of profit by reselling
the land adjacent to a public improvement 101 is the most vigorously opposed
aspect of excess condemnation.10 2 Even under constitutional amendments a
Albany Street, 11 Wend. 149 (N. Y. 1834); Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 88 Atl. 904 (1913). See also CUSHsAN., ExcEss Co:NP.1:IA-
TION (1917); 2 NATIONAL RESOuRCEs CommImITTE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 235 el seq.
The cases are discussed in Hart, Excess Condemnation as a Solution of Some Probolems
of Urban Life (1926) 11 'M. . L. RE%. 222; Nichols, The Use of Excess Condemnalion
in Connection with Housing (1938) 4 LEGAL Nomxs oN LocAL Gov. 14.
98. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 83 At.
904 (1913). This case adopted the passing view that to constitute a public use under
the power of eminent domain there must be a right of use by the public. Compare
Stricldey v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527 (190G) ; Clark v. Nash,
198 U. S. 361 (1905); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 (1695).
These and similar cases have upheld the validity of state statutes authorizing the
condemnation of land for such normally private purposes as mining and irrigation,
since the use might be so conducive to the public welfare as to sustain the exercise of
the power of eminent domain. See Hart, stpra note 97, at 232. The use by the taker
in a private business was treated as incidental to the ultimate public benefit. See
Comment (1930) 18 CALIF. L. Rav. 284, 287.
99. See 2 NATIONAL REsouRcEs Cobm'rrraa, loe. cit. supra note 97.
100. Planning the capitol of Virginia illustrates a successful application of this
theory. See Guucc, MODEN GovzxmE-r. IN A COLONrAL Crry (1932); 2 NA'to:AL
RzsouRacs Com.ItT-EE, loc. cit. supra note 97. Fairmont Parkway in Philadelphia is
an example of what will happen when the protection of excess condemnation is not
afforded.
101. An adjacent landowner may be compelled to pay for the increased value of
his land by special assessments on the property benefited, but the assessments are limited
to the cost of the improvement. See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 543 (1897); Payne
v. Village of South Springfield, 161 111. 285, 44 N. E. 105 (1896). But the courts will
not permit the same result to be achieved by condemning, along with the land actually
needed, excess land which the improvement will benefit in the expectation of reselling
it at an increase in price. See Nichols, loc. cit. supra note 24.
102. Yet the result is no harsher than in other types of condemnation which have
been held constitutional. Cf. Hairston v. Danville & XV. Ry., 20S U. S. 598 (1903)
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specification in advance of purposes for which condemned land is to be used
has been required in an effort to obviate the possibility of this recoupment.10 3
Such a limitation, analogous to the rule of a few earlier cases forbidding the
resale of land for purposes other than those for which it was acquired,1 4
obviously vitiates the effectiveness of excess condemnation. The traditional
notion that unearned increment arising from increased land values should
accrue entirely to private owners is the basic objection to recoupment. 10 5 But
in reality, the objective of public use is defeated by favoring a few fortunately
situated landowners rather than the municipality itself with the major benefit
of public expenditures. A thoroughgoing application of the public benefit
test employed in other eminent domain cases 100 would compel sanction of
recoupment even if it were used solely for the purpose of financing a land
(land condemned to build spur track to private business) ; Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co.,
113 U. S. 9 (1885) (land condemned to erect dam for mill).
103. See Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U. S. 439 (1930). The attitude of the courts
toward excess condemnation should be compared with judicial treatment of substitute
condemnation, which seems indistinguishable under the narrow view of public use
as use by the public. In the substitute condemnation cases, property is condemned to
be transferred to private owners in lieu of property taken from them for a public purpose,
Yet that practice has been sustained. Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362 (1930) ; Meisel
Press Mfg. Co. v. Boston, 272 Mass. 372, 172 N. E. 356 (1930) ; Foley v. Beach Creek
Ext. Ry., 283 Pa. 588, 129 Atl. 845 (1925).
104. See County of Alleghany v. Parrish, 93 Va. 615, 25 S. E. 882 (1896); cf.
Fussell-Graham-Alderson Co. v. Forrest City, 145 Ark. 375, 224 S. W. 745 (1920).
See also 3 MCQUILLAN, op. cit. supra note 23, § 1242 et seq.
It is not clear that this requirement will be enforced. In Merrell v. City of St. Peters-
burg, 74 Fla. 194, 197-98, 76 So. 699, 700 (1917), it was alleged that a purchase of land
was not intended to be used for any lawful municipal purpose but "for the purpose
of assisting certain citizens . . .who bought said lots with others for the purpose of
assisting in the building of a railroad." The court found that the property was acquired
by the city in good faith for present and prospective municipal needs. It affirmed the
holding of the trial judge who said: "I am unable to agree that it is necessary for
the city to show an immediate need for all this property. Certainly it is the part of
wisdom and within the law for the ity to anticipate itg needs and to make reasonable
provisions for its prospective requirements as well as its present demands, and the
purchase of . . . slightly more than two acres ... is not unreasonable and cannot
be said to be an abuse of power."
105. On the subject of unearned increment, see (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 1151, 1152;
Hart, supra note 97, at 229.
106. See discussion at p. 643 supra. Moreover, recent interpretations of public
purpose have recognized the significance of modern planning techniques as public con-
trols. Compare Beus v. City of Soda Springs, 62 Idaho 1, 107 P. (2d) 151 (1940)
(statutory power to acquire waterworks system and supply inhabitants with water
permits the acquisition not only of water rights for present needs, but also to meet
future requirements) ; Campbell v. Teaneck Tp. Committee, 101 N. J. L. 461, 129 Atl.
757 (1925) (extent of land purchase reasonably necessary for public buildings and park
is within discretion of governing body which may consider not only present but estimated
future needs).
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acquisition program. 1°O Moreover, resale of property to secure the profit
from increased land values for the municipality could be sustained as merely
incidental to the exercise of a land planning program. The practice in the
field of watershed planning provides a persuasive analogy. Multiple-purpose
planning of an entire basin is permissible under the federal power over navi-
gable waters or the war power, and recoupment of expenses by selling the
electric power "incidentally" created by such projects is now clearly estab-
lished.108 Thus there should be little judicial doubt as to the validity of recoup-
ment, and if it is sought to be accomplished through purchase rather than
excess condemnation, the arguments suggested should apply with equal force.
Despite the variety of arguments 109 and analogies which may be mar-
shalled in an attempt to circumvent the strict construction placed upon cor-
porate purposes by the courts, a direct attack on the non-functional nature
of the concept itself offers the most fruitful approach. The avowed purpose
of this doctrine is to safeguard the inhabitants of municipalities against locally
instituted undertakings detrimental to their welfare. Yet any municipal activ-
ity, whether expressly or impliedly authorized, is ultimately subjected to
judicial scrutiny, thereby achieving the desired protection. When, however,
a power is expressly granted, the liberal standards of public purpose and pub-
lic use are invoked; but when the authority, arises from implication, the static
concept of corporate purpose is the criterion applied. Since both tests are
designed to preclude similar dangers, the justification for this differentiation
is clearly devoid of any functional basis. A recognition of the fundamental
identity of corporate and public purposes would remove any excuse for ad-
herence to a strict construction of municipal powers; and if municipal land
acquisition were judged by the broadened public purpose standards, there
would be little difficulty in securing judicial approbation of it.
REGULATION OF 'MUNICIPAL LAND ACQUISITION
WVith judicial interference thus reduced to a minimum, increased opportu-
nities for graft, inefficiency, or lack of intelligence in municipal land acquisi-
tion raise serious objections, and some measure of control must be designed
to preclude such possibilities. To permit municipalities to assemble large land
107. That the excess condemnation cases should now be regarded as having been
overruled sub silentio, see Note (19-9) 39 YALE L. J. 128.
108. See, e.g., Oklahoma, ex rel. Phillips v. Atkinson Cu., 313 U. S. 503, 523-34
(1941); United States v. Appalachian Elect. Power Co., 311 U. S. 377, 426 (1940).
109. A further argument that may be invoked in favor of locally initiated land
acquisition is the proposition that only the state can question the power of a municipality
to acquire property. See Champaign v. Harmon, 98 Ill. 491 (1281); Chambers v.
St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543 (1860). Then only negative action by the state would be required
for valid municipal land purchase. But the number of instances in which individuals
have had standing in court to attack municipal property acquisition vitiates the strength
of this position.
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reserves in a haphazard fashion may occasion needless or dishonest expendi-
tures and even intensify rather than alleviate the present maladjustments.
Far-sighted urban, regional, and national planning and control are indispen-
sable if post-war reconstruction is not to be plunged into a series of costly,
inexpedient projects." 0 Such considerations, however, present problems of
administration rather than a challenge to the theoretical validity of public land
ownership.
The most promising administrative safeguard against unintelligent or cor-
rupt land acquisition is the requirement that, as a prerequisite for such acqui-
sition, the municipality adopt a comprehensive master plan, specifically indicat-
ing the areas in which property may legitimately be accumulated. 1 ' Since
the regulation of land acquisition would thus be primarily vested in a local
planning agency, the prevailing pattern of local planning boards of unpaid
citizens, inadequately staffed and devoid of any real power or responsibility,
would have to be replaced by professionally trained planners immunized
from political pressures." 2 Despite the desirability of imposing the initial
and primary responsibility of acquisition upon the municipalities themselves," 0
the integration of a particular local program with regional and national needs
is also essential.1 4 Coordination rather than competition among the acquisi-
tion plans of interrelated communities is clearly fundamental to sound city re-
building. And since planning and land assembly also raise national questions,
it has been proposed that a general supervisory federal agency be empowered
to indicate the broad framework within which regional activity itself should
be conducted." 5 But although regional or national concern may dictate inter-
vention by the Federal Government, the importance of preserving community
autonomy must not be overlooked, for only local initiative and cooperation can
give real substance to an acquisition program.""
Municipal capacity to acquire land in accordance with this proposed pro-
gram is, as pointed out above," 7 dependent upon either state legislation or a
110. See NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, BETTER CITIES (1942) 11 el seq.;
FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 97; Greer, loc. cit. supra
note 1.
111. See FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, op. cit. supra note 1, at 80 ct seq.;
GREER AND HANSEN, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 10; URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, OUTLINE FOR
A LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM TO REBUILD OUR CITIES (1942).
112. See NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, op. cit. supra note 110, at 13.
113. See GREER AND HANSEN, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 10; NATIONAL RESOURCES
PLANNING BOARD, Op. cit. supra note 110, at 13 et seq.; BLACK, op. cit. su pra note 1,
at 1.
114. See BLACK, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 6 el seq.; CONFERENCE ON URBANISM, HAR-
VARD UNIVERSITY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 22; FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 22; NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, op. cit. supra note 110, at S
et seq.
115. See note 111 supra.
116. See note 113 supra.
117. See discussion supra at 639.
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liberal construction of charter powers. Since judicial strictures are much less
severe with legislation than with charter powers, new and far-reaching state
enabling acts providing for extensive municipal land acquisition are the de-
sideratum. And the possibility of substantial federal financial assistance, prob-
ably the only feasible method of financing acquisition, should provide a strong
enough inducement for such legislation.118 As a condition of receiving aid
from the anticipated federal post-war reconstruction program, assistance which
can hardly be ignored in view of the precarious financial condition of many
states and municipalities, states could be required to extend the acquisition
powers of municipalities and to authorize the establishment of revitalized
planning agencies. But should a state legislature, despite the incentive of
financial contributions, prove reluctant or dilatory in passing the requisite
statutes, a local acquisition program would have to be initiated and judicial
approval of it sought.
118. That federal financial aid should be forthcoming. see NATIOA L RPEsouncs
PLANNING BoAR, HousING THE CONTINUING PRO3LEM (1940) 47; GRzn AND HANsEN,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 6; Greer, loc. cit. supra note 1.
